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Abstract 
The future of the Arctic region is a subject of heated debates in both scientific and policy circles. 
The region has an enormous economic potential as a storehouse of mineral resources and as a 
provider of shorter and more cost-effective transportation between Europe and Asia. The Arctic 
is therefore an essential strategic element of the domestic and foreign policies of all Arctic 
states. In addition, there is an increasing economic interest in the region on the part of non-
Arctic states. However, at present, the future of the Arctic region development remains highly 
uncertain. Scenario building is a suitable methodology to imagine alternative plausible futures 
of such a complex and multi-dimensional process and to elaborate successful and robust 
development strategies. This paper provides an overview of the scenario frameworks of Arctic 
futures presented in the literature and analyses key factors that determine these scenarios. 
Overall, we find a growing interest of the international foresight research community in the 
Arctic region that is evident from a number of thorough scenario-building exercises published 
recently. At the same time, we observe two drawbacks. First, the existing studies lack a 
numerical element, that is, the overwhelming majority of the scenario frameworks that can be 
found in the literature are fully qualitative. Quantitative estimates would strengthen the scenario 
narratives and enrich communication, which make them a useful addition to support a 
qualitative scenario framework. Second, the existing studies use a mixture of both internal and 
external factors to describe the underlying uncertainty. This limits the number of factors that 
can be taken into consideration and may be confusing for a potential user of these scenario 
frameworks due to the lack of a systemic view. Such a confusion can happen, for example, if 
some of the external factors underpinning a particular scenario suddenly develop in a direction 
that was not anticipated within the scenario framework. The effect of such a change on the set 
of scenarios and the validity of the scenarios despite this change will be of interest to the user, 
and a clear systems perspective would be conducive to address these questions. Separating 
internal and external factors in a scenario building exercise is particularly useful given that the 
volatility of the global geopolitical, geoeconomic and environmental dynamics is only 
increasing. It is our intention to address these two drawbacks in a scenario building exercise 
within the “Emerging trade routes between Europe and Asia” scenario-building project led by 
IIASA within the Northern Dimension Institute (NDI) Think Tank Action co-funded by the 




Scenarios have been widely used by decision makers in business, industry, and government for 
over 50 years as an unequalled method to study the future before it happens (Ratcliffe, 2000). 
The idea of a scenario building exercise is to think about different futures to “minimize 
surprises” and “broaden the span … of … possibilities” (Mietzner & Reger, 2005).  
 
The Arctic as an emerging region of geopolitical, geoeconomic and geoecological interest 
(Federal Ministry, n.d.) brings about not only opportunities, but also risks. Stakes are high, and 
to deal with inherent uncertainties concerning the development of the Arctic in the future one 
has to work out multiple development options to be able to create a robust portfolio. Exploratory 
scenarios is a suitable methodology to describe delineate future uncertainties (Maier et al., 
2016; Höjer et al., 2008).  
 
Motivated by this reasoning, the “Emerging trade routes between Europe and Asia” project 
aims to bring into a dialogue representatives of academia, policy community, business, and civil 
society in order to look into plausible long-term futures of shipping in the Arctic. We focus on 
shipping as a promising economic activity that can develop vigorously as a consequence of 
climate change and ice melting (Ng et al., 2018; Smith & Stephenson, 2013; Ho, 2010). The 
aim of this project is to co-create several plausible scenarios of how commercial shipping can 
develop in the Arctic given the uncertainty in the global demands, other major transportation 
routes, climate change and technological development.  
 
To position the to-be-developed scenarios in the context of the state-of-the-art literature and to 
concretize a knowledge gap to fill in, this paper undertakes the task to review scenario 
frameworks of Arctic futures published in the literature. In addition, to inform our scenario 
building process, we analyse the key factors of the Arctic futures scenarios from the literature.  
 
Review of Arctic futures scenario frameworks  
 
One of the first scenario frameworks for the Arctic was produced by Brigham (2007) who 
suggested four scenarios over the 2040 horizon. Overall, he expects this once-remote area to 
rise to a globally important region. Catalysts for this change include a rapid climate change and 
an increasing natural-resource extraction activity. Further key factors cover the transportation 
systems, indigenous Arctic people, governance in the Arctic and geopolitical issues. Based on 
these, the study proposes four scenarios: Globalized Frontier in which the Arctic is an integral 
part of the global economy, Adaptive Frontier in which globalization in the Arctic is slower 
than expected, Fortress Frontier in which international tension and resource exploitation in the 
Arctic increase, and Equitable Frontier in which the Arctic develops sustainably as an integral 
part of the global economy. See Table 1 for the summary of these four scenarios.  
Table 1:  Four scenarios for the Arctic by 2040 (Brigham, 2007) 
















New polar air routes 
dramatically increase 
cargo and passenger 
loads. 
Air and marine 
transportation have 




protection and safety.  
Marine and air access 
through the Arctic is 
tightly controlled and 
periodically suspended 
for foreign ships and 
aircraft, partly in 
retaliation against other 
non-Arctic states’ 
actions elsewhere in the 
world. Cargo 
movement is disrupted.  
Transportation is a key 
Arctic industry, and a 
fivefold increase in 
regional marine 
commerce offsets a 
modest reduction in air 



















Rising prices globally 
for commodities 
increase exploitation of 
Arctic resources such as 
nickel, copper, coal, and 
freshwater, as well as 
oil and gas. Overfishing 
is serious problem.  
“Assault” on Arctic 




agreements such as 
strict harvesting quotas 
for fisheries. 
Sustainable 
development is widely 
embraced by most 
stakeholders.  
Arctic states “jealously” 
guard natural resources 
to prevent uncontrolled 
access by global 
community; e.g., 
fishing rights to all but 
the Arctic states have 
been suspended.  
Sustainable practices 
benefit fishing, forestry, 
and reindeer herding, 
while oil production 
plummets. Clean 
freshwater from the 





























While global warming 
has caused some coastal 
communities to wash 
away, commercial 
opportunities brighten 
prospects for Arctic 
indigenous workers, 
reversing exodus of 
Arctic workers 
following the collapse 
of the Soviet Union.  
Indigenous 
organizations have a 






expands opportunities.  
Many indigenous 
peoples are displaced 
from their traditional 




improved, life is 
unstable as illegal 
immigration becomes a 
major problem.  
Poverty among 
indigenous peoples has 
been reduced due to 
revenue sharing from 
industries such as 
tourism, transportation, 

























activity puts the Arctic 
region as a whole at 
greater risk for major 
environmental 
catastrophe, such as 
spills and leaks from 
aging oil and gas 
pipelines. Ice damage to 
ships reawakens public 




protection as an 
imperative is widely 
held among all 
stakeholders, and 
emergency planning is 
proactive. The Arctic 
region has become a 




largely disappeared as 
economic and security 
concerns take 
precedence.  
New areas are added to 
existing Arctic national 
parks, enhancing both 
the environment and the 































compelling – and 
contentious – and have 
put environmental 
issues on the back 
burner for the Arctic 
Council.  
Private-public 
sponsorship aims to 
protect unique natural 
resources and to 
balance economic and 
environmental needs.  
The Arctic Council 
remains strong but 
focused on making the 
region more 
independent and 
exclusionary – a 
position largely 
unchallenged by the 
global community due 
to the Arctic’s 
collective economic and 
military strength.  
The Arctic Council 
promotes a vision of 
social equity and 
environmental well-
being; military presence 
is low, yet security is 
high because tensions 




The Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment Report (AMSA) by the Arctic Council (2009) can be 
regarded as a coryphaeus among Arctic studies. More than 185 experts participated directly in 
the work underpinning the AMSA. Thirteen major AMSA workshops were held from July 2006 
through October 2008 covering a broad range of relevant topics, including the future navigation, 
marine use by indigenous communities, marine incidents (including  sinkings, groundings, 
pollution and other environmental violations, disabling by collision, fire and loss of propulsion), 
environmental impacts, marine infrastructure (including ice navigation training, navigational 
charts, communications systems, port services, reception facilities for ship-generated waste, 
accurate and timely ice information, places of refuge, icebreakers), shipping technologies and 
systems, as well as the future of the Northern Sea Route and the adjacent seas. Scenario 
workshops identified total 120 factors and forces that could shape the future of the Arctic marine 
activity by 2050, including the global trade dynamics and the world trade patterns, the severity 
of climate change, the global oil price, the marine insurance industry, the legal stability and 
governance of marine use in the Arctic Ocean, safety of other global trade routes (notably, the 
Suez Canal and Panama Canal), agreements on the Arctic ship construction rules and global 
operational standards (International Maritime Organization), shipping disasters in the Arctic, 
limited windows of operation for Arctic shipping (the economics of seasonal versus year-round 
Arctic operations), the emergence of China, Japan and Korea as Arctic maritime nations, transit 
fees, conflicts between indigenous and commercial uses of Arctic waterways, new resource 
discoveries, escalation of Arctic maritime disputes, global shift to nuclear energy, socio-
economic impacts of global weather changes etc. Three issues were identified as playing a key 
role in the development of the Arctic: the ongoing globalization of the Arctic through the 
development of the natural resource extraction and resulting destination marine traffic, the 
arrival of the global maritime industry in the Arctic Ocean, and the lack of international policies 
in the form of maritime governance to respond to this arrival.  
 
As a result, four plausible scenarios of the Arctic marine navigation until 2050 were put 
forward. In the Arctic Race scenario, a rapid market development characterized by high 
commodity prices, high demand for Arctic natural resources, and active marine tourism are 
combined with a lack of an integrated set of maritime rules and regulations, and insufficient 
infrastructure to support such a high level of marine activity. In the Polar Lows scenario, a low 
demand for natural resources and minimal marine traffic in the Arctic Ocean are combined with 
the unstable governance, weak and undeveloped regulations and standards. Scenario Polar 
Preserve assumes a low demand for natural resources, Arctic oil and gas, while the governance 
systems regulating the marine use respect the environmental concerns focusing on a systemic 
preservation of the Arctic. Scenario Arctic Saga assumes a high demand for natural resources 
and high trade levels combined with the stable governance of marine use, shared economic and 
political interests of the Arctic states and improved marine infrastructure; concern for the 
preservation of Arctic ecosystems and cultures implies systematic and safe development of oil, 
gas and hard minerals. Table 2 summarizes these four scenarios. 
Table 2:  Four futures for Arctic marine navigation by 2050 (Arctic Council, 2009) 
















• More Demand for 
Resources and Trade 
•  
• Less Stable Governance 
• Less Demand for 
Resources and Trade 
•  
• Less Stable Governance 
• Less Demand for 
Resources and Trade 
•  
• More Stable 
Governance 
• More Demand for 
Resources and Trade 
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High demand and 
unstable governance set 
the stage for an 
economic rush for 
Arctic wealth and 
resources. This is a 
world in which many 
international players 
anxiously move to 
outwit competitors and 
secure tomorrow’s 
resources today. Intense 
interest in Arctic natural 
resources. 
Low demand and 
unstable governance 
bring a murky and 
underdeveloped future 
for the Arctic. This is a 
world in which 
domestic disturbances 
divert attention from 




financial tensions are 
prevalent. 
Low demand and stable 





shipping zones.” This is 
a world where concern 




elsewhere, drives a 
movement toward a 
systematic preservation 
of the Arctic Ocean. 
High demand and stable 
governance lead to a 
healthy rate of 
development that 
includes concern for the 
preservation of Arctic 
ecosystems and 
cultures. This is a world 
largely driven by 
business pragmatism 






















• Global competition 
among many nations 
for future rights to 
resources intensified 
by rise of Asia; new 
oil and gas 
discoveries; 
















generation Avian flu; 
• Recession of Arctic 
ice slower than 
models projected. 
• Arctic oil and gas 
reserves 
disappointing; 
• Alternative energy 
emerges as viable 
source for global 
growth; 
• Public concern about 
climate change and 
conservation, 
especially impacts to 
the Arctic. 
• Expanded global 
economic prosperity; 
• Systematic 
development of oil, 
gas and hard mineral 
resources;  
• Shared economic and 
political interests of 
Arctic states; 





































• Seasonal trans-Arctic 
passage possible, but 
not economical.  




and research, with 
periodic disruptions; 
• Market for ice-class 
ships cools, reducing 
R&D and 
shipbuilding; 




standards, and no new 
infrastructure.  
• Harmonized rules for 
Arctic ship design and 
mariner training; 
• Seasonal trans-Arctic 
shipping possible but 
proves prohibitively 
expensive due to 
environmental 
restrictions, frequent 
patrols and aggressive 
enforcement; 
• Growth of Arctic 
marine tourism 
allowed through 
limited numbers of 
“use permits”.  
• Wide range and 






transport safer and 
more efficient;  
• Comprehensive 
international Arctic 
ship rules;  
• New technologies 
make seasonal trans-
Arctic shipping a 
possibility.  
Arbo et al. (2013) conducted an extensive literature review that summarized the insights of 
more than 50 future-oriented Arctic studies. Their paper did not develop own scenarios, but 
systematically analysed the factors that are key for the Arctic future, which makes it relevant to 
our review. Arbo et al. found that climate change and its social impacts, the demand for Arctic 
resources, economic activities, politics, governance, security, and geopolitical circumstances 
are major factors for the Arctic development. All the reviewed studies expect the Arctic as well 
as the politics and other activities around the region to develop into a very different state in the 
future than it is now.  
 
Arbo et al. distinguished two scenario focuses. The first one is around climate change and the 
receding sea ice cover which allow for expanding economic activity in the Arctic. The most 
frequently mentioned driving forces are population growth, globalization, demand for natural 
resources, technology development, regulatory frameworks, and the search for new shipping 
lanes. The second focus is around politics, governance, and security. Driving forces here 
include the end of the Cold war, economic and political interests of the Arctic states and other 
global players, the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, and disputed boundaries.  
 
All in all, according to this study, the Arctic is expected to become a region of a greater 
economic and political importance in the future. Maritime activities are expected to grow as the 
ice is melting. The region is anticipated to exploit its great resource potential through an 
increase in oil and gas development, shipping, and other commercial activities – although their 
scale and content are uncertain. Challenges include drifting ice, scattered population, distance 
to the main markets, high costs of infrastructure and transportation, lack of trustable 
assessments of oil and gas production, mining, fisheries and tourism, and limited and highly 
uncertain quantitative estimates of the container trade between Asia and Europe.  
 
A report by Haavisto et. al (2016) presents six socio-economic scenarios for the Eurasian Arctic 
by 2040, which focus on the development of shipping, resource extraction and tourism 
industries: Wild West, Silicon Valley, Exploited Colony, Shangri La, Conflict Zone and 
Antarctic. Each scenario is a result of a particular combination of binary states of three 
dimensions: possible future political and economic development (open – closed), initiating 
force of the development of the Arctic (public – private) and the environmental status of the 
Arctic region (dirty – clean), which describe the political, economic, social, technological, and 




Table 3:  Six socio-economic scenarios for the Eurasian Arctic by 2040 (Haavisto et. al, 2016) 
Private – Open – Dirty: Wild 
West 
Private – Open – Clean: Silicon 
Valley  
Public – Open – Dirty: Exploited 
Colony 
• The Arctic area in 2040 is 
described by a laissez-faire 
economic development driven 
by the private sector and 
economic development is 
• Society in 2040 has realized the 
natural carrying capacity of the 
Arctic through extensive R&D 
and communication thereof to 
society through strong science-
• In 2040, the development of the 
Arctic region is heavily guided 
by short-term profit seeking 
behavior where only immediate 
benefits count. Public debates 
prioritized over social and 
environmental concerns. This 
leads to haphazard growth and 
problems in maintaining 
infrastructure and basic services 
(such as health care, education). 
Land use is uncontrolled and 
transitions haphazard. 
Development is in the hands of 
investors and large/multi-
national corporations and Arctic 
resources are mostly privatized. 
Common property rights are 
either non-regulated or based on 
too loose quotas compared to the 
environmental carrying capacity, 
and therefore natural resources 
(e.g. fish) are overharvested and 
ecosystems will degrade.  
• Sea ice retreat is used as an 
excuse to enter the area, which 
creates a snowball effect in 
which new actors start exploiting 
activities in an accelerating pace 
as they rapidly follow the 
successful first movers. This 
leads to a ruse in economic 
activities (oil, gas, tourism). 
Since the risk of accidents is 
high, accidents of varying 
severity occur, such as oil spills, 
shipwrecks and ballast water 
discharges from ships. This 
increases the need for search and 
rescue operations.  
• Technological development is 
making geoengineering a viable 
way to mitigate climate change 
which in long term will slow 
down the progress of sea ice 
retreat. However, it affects the 
global climate and generates new 
ecological and social impacts. 
Thus, there is discussion on the 
rules of geoengineering, and it is 
not in large-scale use yet.  
• Clean technology will lose its 
competitiveness due to lack of 
regulative incentives and the 
development of the Arctic relies 
on environmentally 
unsustainable technologies, such 
as fossil fuels or bottom 
trawling. There is insufficient or 
no (international) regulations 
and law enforcement to guide 
exploration and exploitation, 
which will lead to little 
investment in safety 
technologies and it is not 
policy dialogues. Climate 
change has progressed as 
projected and society has had 
time to adapt to the changes. 
Awareness raising, education 
and global environmental 
awakening have created 
generally accepted sustainability 
standards and guidelines to 
comply with the carrying 
capacity of the Arctic. This gives 
more power to NGOs and creates 
sufficient trust between various 
stake- and rights-holders.  
• Clean technologies boom and are 
competitive. New and sufficient 
funding forms (e.g. 
crowdsourcing) enable 
innovations and breakthroughs 
in technology.  
• Green and clean 
entrepreneurship dominate the 
economy and firms compete 
actively for the best 
environmental performance. The 
scientific community is actively 
involved in product development 
and innovation. Product 
certification and reward-fine 
systems communicate the 
environmental performance of 
economic activities and 
products.  
• New international organizations 
and mechanisms emerge to 
resolve domestic and 
international conflicts and to 
monitor activities in the Arctic. 
However, responsibility in case 
of accidents and everyday life 
relies on private insurances.  
• Regardless of good economic 
and environmental performance, 
social well-being in many Arctic 
regions lags. Corporations lack 
social integrity inside the Arctic, 
which is why social 
infrastructure is not as developed 
as other infrastructure and high 
welfare and health care services 
are not universally available. 
Work-related immigration to the 
Arctic creates large differences 
in the wealth of people, and the 
economy relies largely on a “fly 
in fly out” work force.  
are focused on economic issues, 
resulting in public acceptance to 
the short-term utilization of 
Arctic resources. Oil and gas 
resources are heavily exploited 
by companies which are largely 
publicly owned and operate in 
close guidance and collaboration 
with the public sector. The 
companies are seen as important 
pillars of national economies, yet 
there are high corruption rates.  
• Climate change has progressed 
faster than expected, which 
incites selfish behavior among 
countries and companies. There 
is no scientific or political 
agreement on the natural 
carrying capacity of the Arctic, 
and the global climate system is 
thus not considered a 
constraining factor for Arctic 
development.  
• Rules and regulations, including 
taxes/fines, are too weak to lead 
to a balanced sustainable 
development where social and 
environmental concerns are on 
equal footing with economic 
targets. The area is developed at 
any cost.  
• The area is exploited with 
insufficient safety standards due 
to lacking safety technologies.  
• Deep sea mining is permitted and 
practiced also in the high seas’ 
areas of the Arctic.  
• There is a high influx of workers 
to the area because of increased 
employment possibilities in 
ports, construction, other 
infrastructure, tourism and 
services. This leads to hub-based 
development, which attracts also 
local communities resulting in 
major changes in land use, for 
example increased urbanization. 
The areas outside the hubs 
remain short of any progress.  
• Socio-economic inequalities in 
the area are pronounced and 
conflicts arise between native 
people, immigrant workers and 
public authorities.  
required by rules and 
regulations.  
• Non-Arctic nations will have 
increased access to Arctic 
resources leading to their 
increased economic, military, 
cultural and political power in 
the Arctic.  
• Indigenous peoples and their 
claims are ignored, and their 
subsistence is at risk. Hinting 
and reindeer herding are close to 
vanishing.  
Public – Open – Clean: Shangri 
La 
Closed – Dirty: Conflict Zone Close – Clean: Antarctic  
• The Arctic area in 2040 has 
established a sustainable balance 
between environmental, social 
and economic conditions. 
Natural resources are managed 
sustainably and there are strong 
health policies resulting in 
improved physical and mental 
health as well as improved 
wellbeing of Arctic inhabitants.  
• Regulation is based on public 
deliberation, accurate climate 
and nature’s carrying capacity 
information, and sustainability 
considerations. All land claim 
agreements (between the 
indigenous population and other 
Arctic citizens) have been 
settled.  
• Economic actors have a strong 
bias for Arctic environmental 
protection and conservation, 
which encourages investments in 
R&D of clean technology. As 
one result, tourism causes 
limited stress for the Arctic 
environment.  
• Extensive shipping takes place 
and wide cooperation on 
navigation is practiced. Further 
cooperation takes place in 
searching new technological 
solutions for navigating in ice 
conditions, combating oil spills 
in icy conditions, construction 
work in permafrost areas and 
harnessing renewable energy 
potential under Arctic 
conditions.  
• Overall, national, regional and 
international regulation is clear 
and precise and is practiced from 
a responsible and equalized 
viewpoint. Regulation consists 
of incentive-based policies and 
license systems, which are a 
• In 2040, political instability is 
high, and the Arctic is riddled by 
political conflicts and non-
secure conditions. Also global 
instability prevails because of 
unbalanced distribution of 
resources, such as clean water. 
Conflicts about, for instance, 
land rights and livelihood 
activities between states and the 
native people occur. Arctic 
countries have permanent and 
large-scale military presence in 
the area and military conflicts are 
taking place.  
• International and Pan-Arctic 
organizations have no mandate 
in regulating the area and Arctic 
states lack sufficient 
enforcement capability.  
• Environmental and other safety 
issues are considered secondary 
to national security, which leads 
to high risk operations and 
several environmental disasters 
taking place.  
• The uncertain and unstable 
conditions together with the lack 
of infrastructure hinder long-
term private investments.  
• In 2040, an international Arctic 
Treaty is adopted supported by 
strong climate policy. The 
international community desires 
that uncertainty and risks related 
to the impacts of Arctic resource 
exploitation on climate change 
and environmental degradation 
are too high, and it is safer to turn 
the Arctic into a sanctuary.  
• The global economy is 
decarbonized, and renewable 
resources are politically fostered.  
• Based on the treaty, the Arctic 
area is regulated so that there is 
loss of extractive economic 
interest resulting in a cleaner 
environment. Some small-scale 
economic activities are 
sustained, such as limited eco- 
and scientific tourism. 
Stakeholders and rightsholders 
are committed to preserving 
natural habitats with instruments 
such as land trusts. The few 
private tourism companies 
concentrate on minimizing their 
environmental impact. The 
companies fear loss of 
reputation.  
• Indigenous people gain strong 
land rights and strong 
constituencies. Also other 
residents enjoy stable, yet 
economically less developed 
living conditions. Any 
infrastructure is run by de-
centralized renewable energy. 
Heavy regulation limits 
activities in the Arctic, which in 
turn decreases demand for new 
technological solutions. Thus, 
innovations in Arctic technology 
are slow. 
• Scientific, exclusive, (self-) 
regulated tourism to the unique 
result of awareness raising, 
public information sharing and 
exchange delivered by media 
campaigns.  
• A global consensus of a conflict-
free Arctic prevails, and new co-
operative Arctic institutions 
emerge. These institutions 
possess mechanisms for 
domestic and international 
conflict resolution. High trust in 
compliance is achieved by 
intergovernmental surveillance 
and monitoring.  
• Regulated, small-scale 
aquaculture provides sustainable 
livelihood to local communities.  
areas (North Pole, Northern Sea 




Myllylä et. al (2016) identified strong prospective trends for the Arctic and assessed their 
impact on the development of the Russian Arctic toward 2030. According to their study, the 
most important trend variables include the prices of natural resources, climate change and its 
impacts on the economy, economic structures and consumption patterns, resource-smart and 
eco-efficient technologies and their growing importance, the rise of importance of the 
bioeconomy and biotechnologies, new transport corridors to the North and strengthening 
logistic flows in the North, globalization and corresponding power decentralization, 
developments towards a multi-polar global economy, suitable technological solutions for the 
Arctic environment and their growing demand, digital evolution and ubiquitous technology 
revolution, the growing importance of the Northern Dimension and the Arctic regions for the 
European Union and international development, increasing environmental consciousness in the 
world, the global population growth, and the demographic shift towards an ageing society. 
Based on this, three scenarios were proposed: scenario 1 in which the market forces and 
democracy are strengthening, scenario 2 in which authoritarianism is increasing and a regulated 
economy prevails, and scenario 3 in which the problems are accumulating, and the oil, gas and 
other raw material prices are sinking. Table 4 summarizes these three scenarios.  
  
Table 4:  Russian Arctic development under three different scenarios by 2030 (Myllylä et. al, 2016) 
 Scenario 1 
The market forces and 
democracy are strengthening  
Scenario 2 
Authoritarianism is 
increasing and a regulated 
economy prevails 
Scenario 3 
The problems are 
accumulating, and the oil, gas 










efficient technologies and their 
growing importance, suitable 
technological solutions for the 
Arctic environment and their 
growing need, increasing prices 
of natural resources, climate 
change and its impacts on 
energy economy, economic 
structures and consumption 
patterns. 
Resource-smart and eco-
efficient technologies and their 
growing importance, suitable 
technological solutions for the 
Arctic environment and their 
growing need, increasing prices 
of natural resources.  
Wild card happened, such as 
decreasing prices of natural 
resources, environmental 
catastrophe, war, Ukraine crisis 
and economic sanctions, 







Oil, gas, mining.  
Stronger positions for energy 
and logistic clusters, mining 
industry modernized through 
investments. Military structures 
directed towards prevention of 
terrorism.  
Western Europe is the most 
important energy market for 
Russia.  
Oil, gas, mining.  
Energy, mining, and metal 
refining as well as logistic 
clusters essential. Military 
structures strengthened.  
Asia is a more important energy 
market for Russia than in 
scenario 1.  
Mining, tourism, gas, oil.  
Weakening positions for energy 
and mining clusters. Attempts to 
develop the environmental 
cluster, information and 
communication technology and 
tourism. Inability to strengthen 
























Market and federal level.  Federal level most important.  Exits from crises are sought by 
increasing regional and local 

















NSR (Northern Sea Route) is an 
international trade route year-
round.  
Ports and railways, power 
transmissions networks, IT 
networks, roads and air traffic 
are important targets for logistic 
development. Innovative 
transport solutions actively 
developed and implemented in 
cooperation between Russia and 
international partners.  
NSR mainly Russia’s own raw 
materials exporting use year-
round.  
Ports and railways, power 
transmission networks are 
important targets for logistic 
development. Innovative 
transport solutions and 
technology bought from foreign 
enterprises.  
No year-round use of whole 
NSR.  
Infrastructure investments put 
on hold. IT infrastructure 
developed to start a new wave 
of economic development.  
 
Haavisto et al. (2017) built on Arbo et al. (2013) and reviewed ten socio-economic scenarios 
developed for the Arctic region selected from the earlier literature. They considered the 
following key uncertainties: governance, resources and trade, economic growth of the EU, the 
resource efficiency in the EU, climate change in the Arctic, management of environmental 
pressures in the Arctic, resource development, human factor, land use, changing ecological-
social interactions, perception of the Arctic as open or closed, initiating force of actions (private 
or public sector), and the state of the environment (dirty or clean). The study found that 
governance and natural resources are the main factors, which supports a rather traditional view 
on the Arctic. However, the authors emphasized that since 2015, political factors as a key 
uncertainty have also been gaining importance. As for the climate change, different studies 
present different views of how certain the future global warming projections are (from treating 
global warming as a rather certain trend to considering a large uncertainty around it).   
 
In the Strategic Foresight Analysis Report, NATO (2017) presented two views on the Arctic 
development. The first view foresees an increased range of activities in the Arctic due to the 
growing accesibility of the region. The second view expects that the Arctic region will not be 
exploited as anticipated. Table 5 summarizes the two scenarios. 
Table 5:  Two views on the Arctic (NATO, 2017) 
Increased range of activities in the Arctic due to 
growing accessibility 
Arctic region not exploited as anticipated 
The Arctic region will increasingly open to a range of 
activities such as oil, gas and mineral exploration and 
exploitation, fishing and tourism by Arctic and non-
Arctic nations, increased military use of the High 
North and Arctic regions due to growing accessibility. 
There are factors which may inhibit commercial 
expansion in the region such as the economic balance 
of reduced fuel cost and transit-times due to shorter 
passage routes, against increased costs for ship 
strengthening, equipping, operating and insurance; the 
high costs and difficulties of maintaining 
infrastructure on thawing permafrost; the risk of 
environmental damage, and the massive clean-up 
costs and litigation that would be levied against those 
responsible for incidents and the license-issuing 
states. The Arctic will still be an exceptionally 
unforgiving operating environment, made worse by 
increased severe storm conditions as a result of 
climate change effects. 
 
Zaikov et. al (2019) considered scenarios for the development of the Arctic, including the Arctic 
zone of the Russian Federation, in the long-term perspective (until 2035). They asserted that 
several factors influence the Arctic development scenarios, including the physical and 
geographical features of the region, the world economy and demand for hydrocarbon resources, 
technology status and its possession by a limited number of countries, the state of international 
relations, and the role of Russia. The authors distinguished an optimistic scenario, a pessimistic 
scenario, and a moderate scenario. The optimistic scenario implies an improvement in the 
multilateral relationships in the Arctic region. In contrast, the pessimistic scenario expects a 
deterioration of these relationships. The moderate scenario is in between the two extreme 
scenarios. Table 6 summarizes these three scenarios. 
 
  
Table 6:  Three socio-economic scenarios for the Arctic by 2035 (Zaikov et. al, 2019) 
Pessimistic Moderate Optimistic 
• Tense nature of interstate 
cooperation due to territorial 
disputes (incl. the “Spitzbergen 
issue”); the willingness of 
countries to protect their 
interests outside the national 
Arctic areas; promotion of the 
idea of free borders in the Arctic; 
seeking a UN ban on exploration 
and extraction of minerals in the 
Arctic; defending the right to 
free navigation in the Arctic 
Ocean; 
• Growth of the military presence; 
involvement of the foreign 
Arctic states via NATO. 
Militarization does not meet the 
interests of Russia in the Arctic 
region; 
• The Arctic Council like a 
discussion club; its role in 
solving the problems of the 
Arctic is declining; 
• Cyclical moderate growth of the 
world economy replaced by 
stagnation; the demand for the 
Arctic oil and natural gas 
decreases against the 
development of shale energy; 
production at developed fields in 
the Arctic is falling; geological 
exploration rates are declining; 
transportation along the NSR 
remains uncompetitive; North-
West passage is increasingly free 
of ice during the period of 
navigation; 
• Against international isolation, 
Russia is searching for new 
partners in the development of 
hydrocarbon deposits among 
Asian companies; anxiety of 
environmental organizations 
associated with the exacerbation 
of the ecological situation in the 
Arctic due to poor readiness of 
fields for development; the 
activity of ecological 
organizations near mining sites 
and transportation routes for 
natural resources is interpreted 
as environmental terrorism. 
• Balance between optimistic and 
pessimistic scenarios; 
• Territorial disagreements and the 
desire to control shipping routes 
remain, but these processes are 
not sharp with the expressed 
desire of states to find a solution 
based on international law;  
• The state of bilateral relations 
with the participation of the 
Russian Federation and Western 
states remains tense. Sanctions 
pressure from European and 
North American states 
continues; Asian countries are 
key partners in the Arctic 
projects; 
• The risk of losing control of 
shipping routes in the Indian 
Ocean and representation in the 
scientific community in 
Svalbard make India promoting 
its interests in the Arctic 
carefully with a steady interest in 
the region; 
• The development of the world 
economy stimulates economic 
activity in the Arctic, which 
contributes to maintaining 
attention to the region from 
international environmental 
organizations; 
• North American oil and gas 
companies, combining the 
technology and financial 
resources, actively pursue their 
interests in the exploration and 
extraction of mineral resources 
on land and the shelf of the 
Arctic Ocean; 
• Implicit factors (unpredictable 
aspects of development 
dependent on events that do not 
directly affect the Arctic) as the 
successes of the oil shale 
revolution and, in the long-term 
perspective, of hydrogen energy, 
albeit for a short time, can 
change the attitude towards the 
Arctic resources. Signs of 
negative consequences include 
conserving Arctic projects for 
the development of natural re-
sources and their export to 
foreign markets, a decline in the 
standard of living of the local 
population and, as a result, the 
desertion of the Arctic spaces. 
• Progressive (despite cyclical) 
development of the global 
economy; the demand for natural 
resources of the Arctic and 
transport routes of the Arctic 
Ocean (primarily the NSR, 
although it remains low 
compared to the Suez Canal). All 
this and international 
participation help to continue the 
geological exploration of 
hydrocarbons in new areas of the 
Arctic; 
• Rallying the international 
community around the values of 
the Arctic region (territorial 
integrity, respect for the norms 
of international law, sustainable 
socioeconomic growth, the well-
being of the population, high 
quality of the environment, 
production of new knowledge 
and joint scientific research —
these postulates are in every 
Arctic strategy of Europe and 
North America); 
• Development of public 
diplomacy – cooperation 
between municipalities in the 
Barents Euro-Arctic Region and 
the transfer of knowledge and 
experience; 
• Increasing the role of the Arctic 
Council, which takes binding 
decisions for other countries, 
invites new states interested in 
the use of resources and 
sustainable development of the 
Arctic region to its work; 
• The United States ratify the 
United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea and, as a 
result, prepare an application for 
an increase in the Exclusive 
Economic Zone; growing 
activities of American 
corporations in the Arctic; 
• Mutual understanding between 
the Russian Federation and the 
principal countries of the region 
– the United States, Canada, and 
Norway – in subsoil use and 
transport routes reduces the 
political and military tension in 
the area; 
• Russia's initiatives to find new 
partners for the environmentally 
safe and economically profitable 
The positive significance lies in 
the conservation of resources for 
future generations, the reduction 
of anthropogenic pressure on 
ecosystems, and the preservation 
of a favorable environment; 
• Random factors that can 
influence the choice of scenarios 
are natural disasters, 
technological accidents, acute 
and protracted financial crises, 
arms race, information wars, 
terrorist attacks, the discovery of 
new deposits, unexpected 
technological innovations, 
increasing market volatility, or 
increase in the rate of climate 
change. 
development of natural 
resources in the Arctic among 
non-Arctic states, primarily 




Blair & Müller-Stoffels (2019) built on the workshop “Maritime Futures 2035: The Arctic 
Region” and presented three scenarios for the Arctic development: the most plausible scenario 
Growing Pains, the most consistent scenario The Winner Takes It All, and the most robust 
scenario All Aboard the Arctic Express. They relied on twelve key factors: geopolitical stability, 
accessibility of Arctic sea routes, user-centric information infrastructures and data, global 
economic trends, demand for Arctic resources, regulations and policy affecting Arctic 
operations, major incidents and critical events, predictability of sea ice variability, fluctuating 
energy prices, China’s strategic plan, sustainable and resilient local communities, and the 
trajectory of technological development in marine technologies. Table 7 summarizes these three 
scenarios. 
Table 7:  Three maritime futures scenarios for the Arctic by 2035 (Blair & Müller-Stoffels, 2019) 




Scenario: The Winner 
Takes It All  
Most Robust: All 
Aboard the Arctic 
Express 
Geopolitical stability Status quo (occasional bullying): 
• Current trends continue 
• Showmanship: showing off military might 
• Trying to out-muscle without using muscle 
Mainly verbal threats with occasional cyber and electronic attacks  
Accessibility of Arctic 
sea routes 
Difficult access: 
• Persistent sea ice 
• Unreliable predictive 
models 
• More regulatory 
barriers 
• No new resource 
developments 
Easy access: 
• Less sea ice 
• Reliable predictive models 
• Increasing global agreement, collaboration due to 
collaborative leadership as well as efficient 
coordination 
• New icebreakers 
Strengthened Search and Rescue operational 
networks and infrastructure 
User-centric information 
infrastructures and data 
Few specialized, big actors (data and service providers): 
• Portfolio of regular, public services remains similar to now 
Increase in specialized, commercial, subscription-based services 
Global economic trends Arctic rush: 
• Rising global commodity prices provide incentives for natural development 
resources and destination shipping, fishing, and marine tourism 
• Influx of people increases need for shipping supplies to remote Arctic 
communities 
• More mineral exploration and cruise tourism leading to increased infrastructure 
needs, overwhelming local users / communities 
• More tourism results in more development, increasing the complexity of port 
logistics 
Increased traffic leads to moving traffic into shoulder season, thereby increasing 
high risk operations 
Demand for Arctic 
resources 
Tourism first: 
• People with disposable 
income eager to spend 
on exotic experiences 
• Accessibility of Arctic 
destinations increases 
as does the portfolio of 
metocean services 
needed 
• Adventure tourism 
grows 
• Straining resources and 
cultural values of 
communities 
Fossil futures: 
• Conflict in the Middle 
East increases 
• Alternatives to fossil 
fuel are not viable 
• Rising oil prices 
• Oil crisis creates higher 
demand for Arctic 
fossil fuel 
Seafood first: 
• More processing and 
transport of seafood 
products (increased 
fishing traffic) 
• Global food demand 
grows 
• Global demand for eco-
friendly protein grows 
• Seafood is an 
increasingly valuable 
export commodity from 
Arctic region 
Regulations and policies 
affecting Arctic 
operations 
Economic and commercial uses dominate: 
• Regulations determined by industry (industry writes code) 
• Environmental requirements take a backseat to economic efficiency 
• Ice class and search and rescue requirements may ease 
• Traffic may increase if cost of operations decreases sufficiently 
Major incidents and 
critical events  
Ship crash (medium-to-
large event): 
• More Arctic ship traffic 
increases chances for 
major incidents 
• Incidents are on the rise 
• Major incident occurs 
slowing down shipping 
• A lack of search and 
rescue response 
capacity combined with 
regulations designed to 
facilitate merchant 
necessities and not the 
luxury cruise industry 
leaves major marks on 
the cruise sector 
Status quo: 
• Good record of marine operations 
• Industry reputation is good, slightly blemished at 
times of minor incidents 
Traffic expands in linear relation with local trade 
Predictability of sea ice 
variability  
Gradual improvement of 
predictive models: 








Gradual improvement of 
predictive models: 






• Increased bunker fuel prices 
• Increased replacement of inefficient ships, and building of fuel-efficient ships 
• High fuel costs result in preference toward shorter Arctic route 
• Some sectors hard-hit by large fuel price fluctuations (e.g. cruise industry when 
price is high, extractive industries when prices are low) 
• Industry-friendly regulations are likely in areas that profit from the fossil industry 
• Profitable Arctic operations in extractive industries, increased revenue for fossil 
industry (potential for benefit sharing with communities) 
• Supply chain decision making possible due to predictability or operations and 
contingency planning 
• Increase in Arctic exports 
Insurance availability widens, cost decreases 
China’s strategic plans Chinese finger cuffs: 
• China’s strategic plans 
provoke preemptive 
developments and 
increase in investments 
by Arctic nations 
(control remains within 
the Arctic) 
• China’s and Koreas’ 
strategic plans are 
controlled via pro-
active action by Arctic 
states 
• China's strategic 
investment plans are 
scrutinized and rejected 
to thwart outside 
geopolitical leverage 
Mad Max: 
• Heavy critical 
infrastructure 
investments 
• Shipping shares shift 
toward state-owned 
companies 
• Mining and fishing 
rights shift toward 
Chinese ownership 
• China follows their own 
strategic plans for 
Arctic development 
• Increased demands on 
local resources and 
communities 




• Potential for growth in 
joint information hubs 
and cooperative 
solutions (price of 
information may 
decrease) 
Chinese finger cuffs: 
• China’s strategic plans 
provoke preemptive 
developments and 
increase in investments 
by Arctic nations 
(control remains within 
the Arctic) 
• China’s and Koreas’ 
strategic plans are 
controlled via pro-
active action by Arctic 
states 
• China's strategic 
investment plans are 
scrutinized and rejected 
to thwart outside 
geopolitical leverage 
Sustainable and resilient 
local communities 
Expat haven: 
• Increased influx of people from outside the Arctic region 
• Increase in labor force 
Increasingly mixed cultural identity 
Trajectory of 
development in marine 
technologies  
Techno-utopia for some, stormy seas for others: 
• Favorable regulatory frameworks and intense competition for smart marine 
technologies speed up worldwide technical standardization and cooperation 
• Portfolio of technologies supporting electromagnetic stealth and resilience to 
electromagnetic attacks increases 
• Private sector is confident to invest 
• Big-data analytics advance coupled models’ ground-truthing forecast information 
with in-situ data 
• Robotics, advanced materials and new communication technologies increasingly 
saturate marine operations 
• These new, expensive technologies will require changes in supply chain 
management and likely adopted quicker by larger corporates 
• The speed of green development picks up due to policies incentivizing cleaner, 
more efficient vessels 
• New build orders based on clean, efficient propulsion and powering increase 
• Onboard energy management increases in efficiency, marine fuels focus on novel 
technologies 
• Environmental regulations play catch-up with intensifying activities and new 
places of exploration, increased focus phasing out heavy fuels and search-and-
rescue capacities 
• Increasing complexity of technologies and speed of development requires new 
skills and training from people operating systems and equipment 
• Growing demand for highly qualified sea-going staff 
• Increasing deployment of sensors in remote locations to support users and 
decisionmakers in decision making, and a better understanding of environmental 
preservation needs 
• Unprecedented amount of data available to users aids those with access to big data 
analytics, while those without struggle to translate complex data sets for use 
• Demand for increased portfolio of metocean services continues to rise rapidly: 
increasing demand for data transfer services, public services struggle to keep up 
to finance growing service demands, private subscription-based providers grows  
 
Lovecraft (2019) summarized the results of the workshop “Arctic Futures 2050: Scenarios 
Narratives” and presented seven scenarios. The future scenarios are based on sixteen key 
factors: cryosphere climate change, atmosphere climate change, terrestrial biosphere climate 
change, marine systems climate change, Arctic regional collaboration, Arctic regional security, 
global policy, international security, status of Indigenous peoples, access to markets, extraction 
of renewable resources, extraction of non-renewable resources, Arctic energy systems, public 
health, community sustainability, and science advancement and communication. Table 8 
summarizes these seven scenarios.  
Table 8:  Seven Arctic futures scenarios by 2050 (Lovecraft, 2019) 
Factor\Scenario An insecure Arctic in 
a warmer world with 
high resource 





marine changes are 
transformative as 
incremental social 
changes trend for the 
worse – high 
robustness 
Lowered emissions and 
harmonious regional and 




Climate Change – 
Cryosphere  
Slight melt and thaw 
increase in the Arctic 
Substantial melt and 
thaw in the Arctic 
Little melt or thaw in the Arctic 
Climate Change – 
Atmosphere  
Mid-21st century 
decline in greenhouse 
gas emissions 
Rising greenhouse gas 
emissions throughout 
the 21st century 
Early-21st century decline in 
greenhouse gas emissions 
Climate change – 
Terrestrial Biosphere 
Slight change to 
biomass, fire, and 
biodiversity 
Substantial change to 
temperature and 
biodiversity 
Little or no change to terrestrial 
flora and fauna 
Marine Systems 
Change  
Slightly warmer oceans 




free marine ecosystem 
Oceans absorb only a little heat  
Arctic Regional 
Collaborations 
Collaboration in the Arctic decreases Harmony between national, 
Indigenous, and business 
stakeholders in the Arctic  
Arctic Regional 
Security  
Arctic is insecure Insecure relations 
between Arctic and 
non-Arctic interests  
Arctic interests are secure 
globally  
Global Policy International 
cooperation breaks 
down globally  
Global policy remains 
as is 
Arctic Council as government  
International Security  International security 




Interests around the globe are 
secure  





Governance by and of 
Indigenous peoples 
remains as is 
Increased self-determination 
for Indigenous Peoples 
Access to Markets Decreased 
development in the 
Arctic  
Boom-bust nature of 
arctic markets remains 
as is 






Increased development of renewable resources in 
the Arctic  
U.N. establishes an Arctic 
Development Bank  
Economic 
Development: Non-
Resource Extraction  
Rapid and unregulated resource extraction  Collaborative development of 
the Arctic  
Arctic Energy Systems  Insecure and costly energy resources and 
development  
Increased energy security and 
independence  
Public Health Public health crises  Public health for those 
who can pay for it 
Responsive public health and 
greater well-being  
Community 
Sustainability  
Some communities adapt, innovate, or develop Arctic communities adapt and 
innovative for self-benefit  
Science Advancement 
and Communication  
The globe’s wealthiest corporations wield control 
over science  
Co-production of knowledge 
increases  
 On track for late 
century decline in 
emissions with little 
change in governance 
systems – most 
plausible  
Low emissions and an 
isolated but internally 
collaborative Arctic – 
best emissions, but 
inward looking Arctic  
Emissions 





















no results  
Climate Change – 
Cryosphere  
Substantial melt and 
thaw of the cryosphere  
Little melt or thaw in the Arctic  Complete melt 
and thaw of 
the Arctic  
Climate Change – 
Atmosphere  
Late-21st century 
decline in greenhouse 
gas emissions  
Early-21st century decline in greenhouse 





21st century  
Climate change – 
Terrestrial Biosphere 
Substantial change to 
temperature and 
biodiversity  









temperature, flora, and 
fauna shifts in the 
ocean  








in the Arctic remains as 
is  
Arctic stakeholders 
collaborate with each 
other and not with 
outside interests  
Collaboration 








in the Arctic  
Arctic Regional 
Security  
Arctic security remains 
as is 









Global Policy Global policy remains 
as is 
International policy 
fully addresses arctic 









and concerns  
International Security  International relations 
are characterized by 
distrust  









Status of Arctic 
Indigenous People 
Governance by and of 
Indigenous peoples 




for Indigenous Peoples  
  
Access to Markets Boom-bust nature of 
Arctic markets remains 
as is 
Local planning for 
sustainable markets  
Decreased 
development 









of renewable resources 
in the Arctic  
U.N. establishes Arctic 










the Arctic  
Economic 
Development Non-
Resource Extraction  
Rapid and unregulated 
resource extraction  
Collaborative 




the Arctic  
Collaborative 
development 
of the Arctic  
Arctic Energy Systems  Insecure and costly 













Public Health Public health for those 
who can pay for it 
Responsive public 
health and greater well-
being  














and Communication  
Co-production of 
knowledge increases  
Scientists engage 
increasing number of 





public trust  
 
Key factors  
 
In the context of scenario analysis, factors are defined as “aspects of a social or natural system 
around which there are broad policy issues of particular interest” (Kok et al., 2006). In our 
paper, these are uncertain issues with several distinctly different possible development paths 
that are expected to have a major direct or indirect impact on the future of the Arctic region.  
 
Based on the studies reviewed above, the key factors for the Arctic can be grouped into several 
broad categories:  
• Climate and environment 
• Resource extraction 
• Demand for and supply of resources 
• Trade and economic issues 
• Transportation, shipping and infrastructure  
• (Indigenous) people  
• Governance and geopolitical issues 
• Technological development 
The presence of these key factors and their more specific components in each scenario 
framework reviewed in the previous section are summarized in Table 9, which constitutes the 
main result of our analysis presented in this paper. The presence of factors from a given 
category, the number of factors included, and the role these factors play in defining scenarios 
across the reviewed studies are indicators of the importance of a factor category for the Arctic 
region. Based on this, governance and geopolitical issues appear to be the most important group 
of factors, followed by resource extraction and climate and environment. Trade and economic 
issues as well as transportation, shipping and infrastructure are the least presented categories. 
Let us point out that these factor categories contain both global and regional, i.e., Arctic-




This paper reviews the scenarios of the development of the Arctic region presented in the 
literature. The analysis reveals a growing attention of the international foresight research 
community to the Arctic region in the recent years, which can be attributed to the increasing 
geopolitical importance of the Arctic.  
 
By scanning through the existing scenarios for the Arctic development, we have summarized 
the key factors that are expected to have a major direct or indirect impact on the future of the 
Arctic region, of which governance-, resource- and environment-related issues appear to be 
most frequently used. Trade- and transport-related issues are underrepresented in the reviewed 
studies.  
 
The reviewed studies employed both regional and global factors to construct scenarios. Mixing 
two scales in one scenario-building effort limits the number of factors that can be considered 
and complicates assessment of the plausibility of the scenarios. A scenario framework that 
separates two scales would complement and enrich the already existing scenarios of the future 
development of the Arctic.  
 
Another weakness of the existing regional scenarios of the development of the Arctic region is 
that they are all qualitative in nature and lack quantification of the major trends. The foresight 
community recognizes the value of complementing the qualitative scenarios by quantitative 
elements. However, to the best of our knowledge, such an effort has not yet been conducted for 
the Arctic region.    
The “Emerging trade routes between Europe and Asia” scenario-building project intends to 
address these two weaknesses. We will build on a global scenario framework and construct 
regional scenarios that will combine qualitative and quantitative elements. This will provide an 
enriched and systemic view on the plausible futures of the region and set the stage for the 
development of robust win-win strategies to boost the economic potential of the Artic in a 
sustainable manner.  
 
Table 9:  Key factors for the Arctic 
Authors and 
year 
Brigham 2007 Arctic Council 
2009 
Arbo et al. 2013 Haavisto et al. 
2016 
Myllylä et al. 
2016 
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